HAETAE: Post-Quantum Digital Signature
HAETAE is a module lattice-based signature scheme for shorter and easily maskable signatures. While based on the Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm, like the NIST-selected Dilithium signature scheme, our design choices target an improved complexity/compactness compromise that is highly relevant for many space-limited scenarios such as DNSSEC. We primarily focus on reducing signature and verification key sizes so that signatures fit into one TCP or UDP datagram while preserving a high level of security against a variety of attacks.
Fiat-Shamir with Aborts
HAETAE follows the "Fiat-Shamir with Aborts" paradigm, like Dilithium or BLISS, which guarantees quantum security (in the QROM).
To offer more flexibility and smaller sizes without losing in terms of implementation efficiency, HAETAE relies on module lattices. Varying the security and updating the parameter sets is easily achievable with the size-speed trade-offs.
We use a bimodal distribution for the rejection sampling to reduce the sizes, like in the BLISS signature scheme, instead of a "unimodal" distribution like Dilithium.
Hyperball uniform sampling
Compact compression & encoding
We further reduce the key and the signature sizes by truncating the verification key and by compressing and encoding the signature.
HAETAE can be accelerated significantly by precomputing the hyperball samples.
All benchmarks were obtained on one core of an Intel Core i7-10700k, with TurboBoost and hyperthreading disabled. All cycle counts reported are the median of the cycle counts of 1,000 executions of the respective functions.
The HAETAE team consists of the following members (KpqC round 1 & NIST Additional Signature round 1).
After 1st round KpqC submission, the following members have joined/contributed.